Online Papers

Frege Arithmetic and "Everyday Mathematics"

frege.brown.edu

The purpose of this note is to demonstrate that predicative Frege arithmetic naturally interprets some weak but non-trivial arithmetical theories. The weak theories in question are all related to Tarski, Mostowski, and Robinson's R. In saying that the interpretation is "natural", I mean that it relies only upon "definitions" of arithmetical notions that are themselves "natural", that is, that have some claim to be "definitions" in something other than a purely formal sense. Show Abstract

Formal Arithmetic Before Grundgesetze

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A speculative investigation of how Frege's logical views change between Begriffsschrift and Grundgesetze and how this might have affected the formal development of logicism. Show Abstract

The Function is Unsaturated (with Robert May)

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An investigation of what Frege means by his doctrine that functions (and so concepts) are 'unsaturated'. We argue that this doctrine is far less peculiar than it is usually taken to be. What makes it hard to understand, oddly enough, is the fact that it is so deeply embedded in our contemporary understanding of logic and language. To see this, we look at how it emerges out of Frege's confrontation with the Booleans and how it expresses a fundamental difference between Frege's approach to logic and theirs. Show Abstract

Semantics and Context-Dependence: Towards a Strawsonian Account

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This paper considers a now familiar argument that the ubiquity of context-dependence threatens the project of natural language semantics, at least as that project has usually been conceived: as concerning itself with `what is said' by an utterance of a given sentence. I argue in response that the `anti-semantic' argument equivocates at a crucial point and, therefore, that we need not choose between semantic minimalism, truth-conditional pragmatism, and the like. Rather, we must abandon the idea, familiar from Kaplan and others, that utterances express propositions `relative to contexts' and replace it with the Strawonian idea that speakers express propositions by making utterances in contexts. The argument for this claim consists in a detailed investigation of the particular case of demonstratives, which I argue demand such a Strawsonian treatment. I then respond to several objections, the most important of which allege that the Strawsonian account somehow undermines the project of natural language semantics, or threatens the semantics-pragmatics distinction
Please note that the paper posted here is an extended version of what will be published. Show Abstract

Truth In Frege (with Robert May)

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A general survey of Frege's views on truth, the paper explores the problems in response to which Frege's distinctive view that sentences refer to truth-values develops. It also discusses his view that truth-values are objects and the so-called regress argument for the indefinability of truth. Finally, we consider, very briefly, the question whether Frege was a deflationist. Show Abstract

Is Indeterminate Identity Incoherent?

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In "Counting and Indeterminate Identity", N. Ángel Pinillos develops an argument that there can be no cases of 'Split Indeterminate Identity'. Such a case would be one in which it was indeterminate whether a=b and indeterminate whether a=c, but determinately true that b≠c. The interest of the argument lies, in part, in the fact that it appears to appeal to none of the controversial claims to which similar arguments due to Gareth Evans and Nathan Salmon appeal. I argue for two counter-claims. First, the formal argument fails to establish its conclusion, for essentially the same reason Evans's and Salmon's arguments fail to establish their conclusions. Second, the phenomena in which Pinillos is interested, which concern the cardinalities of sets of vague objects, manifest the existence of what Kit Fine called `penumbral connections', phenomena that the logics Pinillos considers are already known not to handle well. Show Abstract

What Is a Singular Term?

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This paper discusses the question whether it is possible to explain the notion of a singular term without invoking the notion of an object or other ontological notions. The framework here is that of Michael Dummett's discussion in Frege: Philosophy of Language. I offer an emended version of Dummett's conditions, accepting but modifying some suggestions made by Bob Hale, and defend the emended conditions against some objections due to Crispin Wright.
This paper dates from about 1989. It originally formed part of a very early draft of what became my Ph.D. dissertation. I rediscovered it and began scanning it, when I had nothing better to do, in Fall 2001, making some minor editing changes along the way. Suffice it to say that it no longer represents my current views. Show Abstract

Are There Different Kinds of Content?

frege.brown.edu, philpapers.org

in an earlier paper, "Non-conceptual Content and the 'Space of Reasons'", I distinguished two forms of the view that perceptual content is non-conceptual, which I called the 'state view' and the 'content view'. On the latter, but not the former, perceptual states have a different kind of content than do cognitive states. Many have found it puzzling why anyone would want to make this claim and, indeed, what it might mean. This paper attempts to address these questions. Show Abstract

Cardinality, Counting, and Equinumerosity

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Frege famously held that there is a close connection between our concept of cardinal number and the notion of one-one correspondence, a connection enshrined in Hume's principle. Husserl, and later Parsons, objected that there is no such close connection that our most primitive conception of cardinality arises from our grasp of the practice of counting. I argue, however, that Frege was close to right, that our concept of cardinal number is closely connected with a notion like that of one-one correspondence, a more primitive notion we might call just as many. Show Abstract

Communication and Knowledge: Rejoinder to Byrne and Thau

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A reply to Byrne and Thau's criticisms of "The Sense of Communiction". Show Abstract

The Composition of Thoughts (with Robert May)

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Are Fregean thoughts compositionally complex and composed of senses? We argue that, in Begriffsschrift, Frege took 'conceptual contents' to be unstructured, but that he quickly moved away from this position, holding just two years later that conceptual contents divide of themselves into 'function' and 'argument'. This second position is shown to be unstable, however, by Frege's famous substitution puzzle. For Frege, the crucial question the puzzle raises is why "The Morning Star is a planet" and "The Evening Star is a planet" have different contents, but his second position predicts that they should have the same content. Frege's response to this antinomy is of course to distinguish sense from reference, but what has not previously been noticed is that this response also requires thoughts to be compositionally complex, composed of senses. That, however, raises the question just how thoughts are composed from senses. We reconstruct a Fregean answer, one that turns on an insistence that this question must be understood as semantic rather than metaphysical. It is not a question about the intrinsic nature of residents of the third realm but a question about how thoughts are expressed by sentences. Show Abstract

The Consistency of Predicative Fragments of Frege's Grundgesetze der Artithmetik

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As is well-known, the formal system in which Frege works in his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik is formally inconsistent, Russell's Paradox being derivable in it.This system is, except for minor differences, full second-order logic, augmented by a single non-logical axiom, Frege's Axiom V. It has been known for some time now that the first-order fragment of the theory is consistent. The present paper establishes that both the simple and the ramified predicative second-order fragments are consistent, and that Robinson arithmetic, Q, is relatively interpretable in the simple predicative fragment. The philosophical significance of the result is discussed. Show Abstract

Critical Notice of Michael Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics

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Definition by Induction in Frege's Grundgesetze der Arithmetik

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Discusses Frege's account of definition by induction in Grundgesetze and the two key theorems Frege proves using it. Show Abstract

The Development of Arithmetic in Frege's Grundgesetze der Arithmetik

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Frege's development of the theory of arithmetic in his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik had long been ignored, since the formal theory of the Grundgesetze is inconsistent. His derivations of the axioms of arithmetic from what is known as Hume's Principle do not, however, depend upon the Basic Law of the system, Basic Law V, which is responsible for the inconsistency. On the contrary, Frege's proofs constitute a derivation of axioms for arithmetic from Hume's Principle, in (axiomatic) second-order logic. Moreover, though Frege does prove each of the now standard Dedekind-Peano axioms, his proofs are devoted primarily to the derivation of his own axioms for arithmetic, which are somewhat different (though of course equivalent). These axioms, which may be yet more intuitive than the Dedekind-Peano axioms, may be taken to be "The Basic Laws of Cardinal Number", as Frege understood them. Show Abstract

Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik §§82-83 (with George Boolos)

frege.brown.edu

This paper contains a close analysis of Frege's proofs of the axioms of arithmetic §§70-83 of Die Grundlagen, with special attention to the proof of the existence of successors in §§82-83. Reluctantly and hesitantly, we come to the conclusion that Frege was at least somewhat confused in those two sections and that he cannot be said to have outlined, or even to have intended, any correct proof there. The proof he sketches is in many ways similar to that given in Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, but fidelity to what Frege wrote in Die Grundlagen and in Grundgesetze requires us to reject the charitable suggestion that it was this (beautiful) proof that he had in mind in §§82-83. Show Abstract

Do Demonstratives Have Senses?

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Frege held that referring expressions in general, and demonstratives and indexicals in particular, contribute more than just their reference to what is expressed by utterances of sentences containing them. Heck first attempts to get clear about what the sense of the Fregean view is, arguing that it rests upon a certain conception of linguistic communication that is ultimately indefensible. On the other hand, however, he argues that understanding a demonstrative (or indexical) utterance requires one to think of the object denoted in an appropriate way. This fact makes it difficult to reconcile the view that referring expressions are 'directly referential' with any view that seeks (as Grice's does) to ground meaning in facts about communication. Show Abstract

The Existence (and Non-existence) of Abstract Objects

frege.brown.edu

This paper is concerned with neo-Fregean accounts of reference to abstract objects. It develops an objection to the most familiar such accounts, due to Bob Hale and Crispin Wright, based upon what I call the 'proliferation problem': Hale and Wright's account makes reference to abstract objects seem too easy, as is shown by the fact that any equivalence relation seems as good as any other. The paper then develops a response to this objection, and offers an account of what it is for abstracta to exist that is Fregean in spirit but more robust than familiar views. Show Abstract

The Finite and the Infinite in Frege's Grundgesetze der Arithmetik

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Discusses Frege's formal definitions and characterizations of infinite and finite sets. Speculates that Frege might have discovered the "oddity" in Dedekind's famous proof that all infinite sets are Dedekind infinite and, in doing so, stumbled across an axiom of countable choice. Show Abstract

Finitude and Hume's Principle

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The paper formulates and proves a strengthening of 'Frege's Theorem', which states that axioms for second-order arithmetic are derivable in second-order logic from Hume's Principle, which itself says that the number of Fs is the same as the number of Gs just in case the Fs and Gs are equinumerous. The improvement consists in restricting this claim to finite 'srsquos Principle' also suffices for the derivation of axioms for arithmetic and, indeed, is equivalent to a version of them, in the presence of Frege's definitions of the primitive expressions of the language of arithmetic. The philosophical significance of this result is also discussed. Show Abstract

Frege and Semantics

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This paper discusses the question to what extent Frege made serious use of semantical notions such as reference and truth. It focuses on his apparent uses of these notions in his apparently semantical discussions of his formal system in Grundgesetze der Arithmetik and defends the view that they are to be taken at face value. This paper is in some ways a companion to "Grundgesetze der Arithmetik I §§29-32", in which there is an extended, but mostly technical, discussion of Frege's attempt to prove that every well-formed expression in his formal language denotes: This paper contains more in the way of a discussion of the wider, interpretive significance of the technical interpretation given there. Show Abstract

Frege on Identity and Identity-Statements: A Reply to Thau and Caplan

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In "What's Puzzling Gottlob Frege?", Michael Thau and Ben Kaplan argue that, contrary to the common wisdom, Frege never abandoned the view of identity-statments he had held in Begriffsschrift. I argue (a) that the textual evidence Thau and Caplan present does not support their view and (b) that there is overwhelming textual evidence in favor of the orthodox reading of "On Sense and Reference". Show Abstract

Frege's Contribution to Philosophy of Language (with Robert May)

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An investigation of Frege's various contributions to the study of language, focusing on three of his most famous doctrines: that concepts are unsaturated, that sentences refer to truth-values, and that sense must be distinguished from reference. Show Abstract

Frege's Principle

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This paper explores the relationship between Hume's Prinicple and Basic Law V, investigating the question whether we really do need to suppose that, already in Die Grundlagen, Frege intended that HP should be justified by its derivation from Law V. Show Abstract

Frege's Theorem: An Introduction

frege.brown.edu

A brief, non-technical introduction to technical and philosophical aspects of Frege's philosophy of arithmetic. The exposition focuses on Frege's Theorem, which states that the axioms of arithmetic are provable, in second-order logic, from a single non-logical axiom, "Hume's Principle", which itself is: The number of Fs is the same as the number of Gs if, and only if, the Fs and Gs are in one-one correspondence. Show Abstract

Frege's Theorem: An Overview

An introduction to the book, and an overview of my views on Frege's Theorem and its significance. Show Abstract

Grundgesetze der Arithmetik I §§29-32

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Frege's intention in section 31 of Grundgesetze is to show that every well-formed expression in his formal system denotes. But it has been obscure why he wants to do this and how he intends to do it. It is argued here that, in large part, Frege's purpose is to show that the smooth breathing, from which names of value-ranges are formed, denotes; that his proof that his other primitive expressions denote is sound and anticipates Tarski's theory of truth; and that the proof that the smooth breathing denotes, while flawed, rests upon an idea now familiar from the completeness proof for first-order logic. The main work of the paper consists in defending a new understanding of the semantics Frege offers for the quantifiers: one which is objectual, but which does not make use of the notion of an assignment to a free variable. Show Abstract

Grundgesetze der Arithmetik I §10

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in section 10 of Grundgesetze, Frege confronts an indeterminacy left by his stipulations regarding his 'smooth breathing', from which names of valueranges are formed. Though there has been much discussion of his arguments, it remains unclear what this indeterminacy is; why it bothers Frege; and how he proposes to respond to it. The present paper attempts to answer these questions by reading section 10 as preparatory for the (fallacious) proof, given in section 31, that every expression of Frege's formal language denotes. Show Abstract

Idiolects

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Defends the view that the study of language should concern itself, primarily, with idiolects. The main objections considered are forms of the normativity objection. Show Abstract

Is Compositionality a Trivial Principle?

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Primarily a response to Paul Horwich's "Composition of Meanings", the paper attempts to refute his claim that compositionality—roughly, the idea that the meaning of a sentence is determined by the meanings of its parts and how they are there combined—imposes no substantial constraints on semantic theory or on our conception of the meanings of words or sentences. Show Abstract

Julius Caesar and Basic Law V

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This paper dates from about 1994: I rediscovered it on my hard drive in the spring of 2002. It represents an early attempt to explore the connections between the Julius Caesar problem and Frege's attitude towards Basic Law V. Most of the issues discussed here are ones treated rather differently in my more recent papers "The Julius Caesar Objection" and "Grundgesetze der Arithmetik I §10". But the treatment here is more accessible, in many ways, providing more context and a better sense of how this issue relates to broader issues in Frege's philosophy. Show Abstract

The Julius Caesar Objection

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This paper argues that that Caesar problem had a technical aspect, namely, that it threatened to make it impossible to prove, in the way Frege wanted, that there are infinitely many numbers. It then offers a solution to the problem, one that shows Frege did not really need the claim that 'numbers are objects', not if that claim is intended in a form that forces the Caesar problem upon us. Show Abstract

A Liar Paradox

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The purpose of this note is to present some strong forms of the liar paradox. They are strong because the logical resources needed to generate them paradox are weak. The only logical resources used are: (i) conjunction introduction; (ii) substitution of identicals; and (iii) the inference: From ¬(p & p), infer ¬p. We then get a paradox if we assume either (a) the `transparency' of truth and the law of non-contradiction or (b) the schemata: ¬(S & T(¬S); and ¬(¬S & ¬T(¬S).
The lesson I would like to draw is: There can be no consistent solution to the Liar paradox that does not involve abandoning truth-theoretic principles that should be every bit as dear to our hearts as the T-scheme. So we shall have to learn to live with the Liar, one way or another. Show Abstract

A Logic for Frege's Theorem

frege.brown.edu

It has been known for a few years that no more than Pi-1-1 comprehension is needed for the proof of "Frege's Theorem". One can at least imagine a view that would regard Pi-1-1 comprehension axioms as logical truths but deny that status to any that are more complex—a view that would, in particular, deny that full second-order logic deserves the name. Such a view would serve the purposes of neo-logicists. It is, in fact, no part of my view that, say, Delta-3-1 comprehension axioms are not logical truths. What I suggest, however, is that there is a special case to be made on behalf of Pi-1-1 comprehension. Making the case involves investigating extensions of first-order logic that do not rely upon the presence of second-order quantifiers. A formal system for so-called "ancestral logic" is developed, and it is then extended to yield what I call "Arché logic". Show Abstract

MacFarlane on Relative Truth

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John MacFarlane has made relativism popular again. Focusing just on his original discussion, I argue that the data he uses to motivate the position do not, in fact, motivatie it at all. Many of the points made here have since been made, independently, by Hermann Cappelen and John Hawthorne, in their book Relativism and Monadic Truth. Show Abstract

Meaning and Truth-conditions

frege.brown.edu, philpapers.org

Develops a conception of how knowledge of meaning is put to use in communication. Along the way, it defends the view that understanding can be identified with knowledge of T-sentences against the classical criticisms of Foster and Soames. Show Abstract

Meaning and Truth-conditions: A Reply to Kemp

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In his "Meaning and Truth-Conditions", Gary Kemp offers a reconstruction of Frege's infamous 'regress argument', which purports to rely only upon the premises that the meaning of a sentence is its truth-condition and that each sentence expresses a unique proposition. If cogent, the argument would show that only someone who accepts a form of semantic holism can use the notion of truth to explain that of meaning. I respond that Kemp relies heavily upon what he himself styles "a literal, rather wooden" understanding of truth-conditions. I explore alternatives, and say a few words about how Frege's regress argument might best be understood. Show Abstract

Non-conceptual Content and the 'Space of Reasons'

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In Mind and World, John McDowell argues against the view that perceptual representation is non-conceptual. The central worry is that this view cannot offer any reasonable account of how perception bears rationally upon belief. I argue that this worry, though sensible, can be met, if we are clear that perceptual representation is, though non-conceptual, still in some sense 'assertoric': Perception, like belief, represents things as being thus and so. Show Abstract

A Note on the Logic of Higher-order Vagueness

frege.brown.edu, analysis.oxfordjournals.org, philpapers.org

A discussion of Crispin Wright's 'paradox of higher-order vagueness', I suggest that the paradox may be resolved by careful attention to the logical principles used in its formulation. In particular, I focus attention on the rule of inference that allows for the inference from A to 'Definitely A', and argue that this rule, though valid, may not be used in subordinate deductions, e.g., in the course of a conditional proof. Wright's paradox uses the rule (or its equivalent) in this way. Show Abstract

On the Consistency of Second-order Contextual Definitions

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One of the earliest discussions of the so-called 'bad company' objection to Neo-Fregeanism, I show that the consistency of an arbitrary second-order 'contextual definition' (nowadays known as an 'abstraction principle' is recursively undecidable. I go on to suggest that an acceptable such principle should satisfy a condition nowadays known as 'stablity'. Show Abstract

Ramified Frege Arithmetic

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Øystein Linnebo has shown that the existence of successors cannot be proven in predicative Frege arithmetic, that is, predicative second-order logic plus "Hume's Principle" and Frege's definitions of zero, predecessor, and natural number. It is shown in the present paper that the existence of successors can be proven if the logic is strengthened to ramified predicative second-order logic. It then follows from work by John Burgess and Allen Hazen that Robinson arithmetic, Q, can be interpreted in ramified Frege arithmetic. Show Abstract

Reason and Language

frege.brown.edu

John McDowell has often emphasized the fact that the use of langauge is a rational enterprise. In this paper, I explore the sense in which this is so, arguing that our use of language depends upon our consciously knowing what our words meana. I call this a 'cognitive conception of semantic competence'. The paper also contains a close analysis of the phenomenon of implicature and some suggestions about how it should and should not be understood. Show Abstract

Reply to Hintikka and Sandu: Frege and Second-order Logic (with Jason Stanley)

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Hintikka and Sandu had argued that 'Frege's failure to grasp the idea of the standard interpretation of higher-order logic turns his entire foundational project into a hopeless daydream' and that he is 'inextricably committed to a non-standard interpretation' of higher-order logic. We disagree. Show Abstract

Self-reference and the Languages of Arithmetic

frege.brown.edu, philmat.oxfordjournals.org, philpapers.org

It is often said that diagonalization allows one to construct sentences that are self-referential. This paper investigates the sense in which that is true. I argue first that, in the standard language of arithmetic, in which we have only the symbols 0, S, +, and ×, truly self-referential sentences cannot be constructed. This problem can be resolved by expanding the language to include function-symbols for all primitive recursive functions. It can also be resolved by proving a stronger form of the diagonal lemma that I call the "structural" diagonal lemma. At the end of the paper, it is argued, however, that there are some contexts in which the latter method is insufficient. Show Abstract

Semantic Accounts of Vagueness

frege.brown.edu

Read as a comment on Crispin Wright's "Vagueness: A Fifth Column Approach", this paper defends a form of supervaluationism against Wright's criticisms. Along the way, however, it takes up the question what is really wrong with Epistemicism, how the appeal of the Sorities ought properly to be understood, and why Contextualist accounts of vagueness won't do. Show Abstract

The Sense of Communication

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Many philosophers nowadays believe Frege was right about belief, but wrong about language: The contents of beliefs need to be individuated more finely than in terms of Russellian propositions, but the contents of utterances do not. I argue that this 'hybrid view' cannot offer no reasonable account of how communication transfers knowledge from one speaker to another and that, to do so, we must insist that understanding depends upon more than just getting the references of terms right. Show Abstract

Sir Michael Anthony Eardley Dummett, 1925-2011

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An account of Dummett's work in the philosophy of mathematics. Show Abstract

Solving Frege's Puzzle

www.journalofphilosophy.org, frege.brown.edu

So-called 'Frege cases' pose a challenge for anyone who would hope to treat the contents of beliefs (and similar mental states) as Russellian propositions: It is then impossible to explain people's behavior in Frege cases without invoking non-intentional features of their mental states, and doing that seems to undermine the intentionality of psychological explanation. In the present paper, I develop this sort of objection in what seems to me to be its strongest form, but then offer a response to it. I grant that psychological explanation must invoke non-intentional features of mental states, but it is of crucial importance which such features must be referenced. It emerges from a careful reading of Frege's own view that we need only invoke what I call 'formal' relations between mental states. I then claim that referencing such 'formal' relations within psychological explanation does not undermine its intentionality in the way that invoking, say, neurological features would. The central worry about this view is that either (a) 'formal' relations bring narrow content in through back door or (b) 'formal' relations end up doing all the explanatory work. Various forms of each worry are discussed. The crucial point, ultimately, is that the present strategy for responding to Frege cases is not available either to the 'psycho-Fregean', who would identify the content of a belief with its truth-value, nor even to someone who would identify the content of a belief with a set of possible worlds. It requires the sort of rich semantic structure that is distinctive of Russellian propositions. There is therefore no reason to suppose that the invocation of 'formal' relations threatens to deprive content of any work to do.
Note: The copy of the paper on frege.brown.edu is of a longer version than the one that was published. Show Abstract

Syntactic Reductionism

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Syntactic Reductionism, as understood here, is the view that the 'logical forms' of sentences in which reference to abstract objects appears to be made are misleading so that, on analysis, we can see that no expressions which even purport to refer to abstract objects are present in such sentences. After exploring the motivation for such a view, and arguing that no previous argument against it succeeds, sentences involving generalized quantifiers, such as 'most', are examined. It is then argued, on this basis, that Syntactic Reductionism is untenable. Show Abstract

Tarski, Truth, and Semantics

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John Etchemendy has argued that it is but "a fortuitous accident" that Tarski's work on truth has any signifance at all for semantics. I argue, in response, that Etchemendy and others, such as Scott Soames and Hilary Putnam, have been misled by Tarski's emphasis on definitions of truth rather than theories of truth and that, once we appreciate how Tarski understood the relation between these, we can answer Etchemendy's implicit and explicit criticisms of neo-Davidsonian semantics. Show Abstract

That There Might Be Vague Objects (So Far as Concerns Logic)

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Gareth Evans has argued that the existence of vague objects is logically precluded: The assumption that it is indeterminate whether some object a is identical to some object b leads to contradiction. I argue in reply that, although this is true—I thus defend Evans's argument, as he presents it—the existence of vague objects is not thereby precluded. An 'Indefinitist' need only hold that it is not logically required that every identity statement must have a determinate truth-value, not that some such statements might actually fail to have a determinate truth-value. That makes Indefinitism a cousin of mathematical Intuitionism. Show Abstract

Truth and Disquotation

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Hartry Field has suggested that we should adopt at least a methodological deflationism: "[W]e should assume full-fledged deflationism as a working hypothesis. That way, if full-fledged deflationism should turn out to be inadequate, we will at least have a clearer sense than we now have of just where it is that inflationist assumptions...are needed." I argue here that we do not need to be methodological deflationists. More precisely, I argue that we have no need for a disquotational truth-predicate; that the word 'true', in ordinary language, is not a disquotational truth-predicate; and that it is not at all clear that it is even possible to introduce a disquotational truth-predicate into ordinary language. If so, then we have no clear sense how it is even possible to be a methodological deflationist. My goal here is not to convince a committed deflationist to abandon his or her position. My goal, rather, is to argue, contrary to what many seem to think, that reflection on the apparently trivial character of T-sentences should not incline us to deflationism. Show Abstract

Use and Meaning

frege.brown.edu, philpapers.org

Many philosophers have been attracted to the idea that meaning is, in some way or other, determined by use—chief among them, perhaps, Michael Dummett. But John McDowell has argued that Dummett, and anyone else who would seek to draw serious philosophical conclusions from this claim, must face a dilemma: Either the use of a sentence is characterized in terms of what it can be used to say, in which case profound philosophical consequences can hardly follow, or it will be impossible to make out the sense in which the use of language is a rational activity. The paper evaluates McDowell's arguments and, in so doing, attempts to offer an initial sketch of how the notion of use might be so understood that the claim that use determines meaning is a substantive one. (I do not take any stand here on whether one should accept that claim.) Show Abstract